solved Your second Reaction Paper is aimed at evaluating what you

Your second Reaction Paper is aimed at evaluating what you have learned about Ethics and Politics and how they fit together.  After coming to understand the ethical theories of the thinkers we studied in the Ethics module, and the thinkers we studied in the Political Science module, you should be able to see some fundamental similarities and differences.  For example, you may find that a person’s ethical or political perspective is formed by an underlying vision of human nature.  That means that human nature is even more fundamental that the ethical and political theories we looked at – and may be a field in which we can connect them.  In fact, you may begin to notice that, given a particular view of human nature, one will gravitate toward an ethical and political system that line up.  If one believes that people are rational and can control themselves, then they will tend to accept an ethical system that prioritizes individual development – and also a political system which allows for lots of liberty.  In other words, you might find that one of the ethical theories we studied, connects with, matches or lines up with a political theory.  A political theory tries to provide “what is truly good for the whole,” but must rely on an understanding “what is truly good,” or ethics, in the first place.  With this in mind, react to the following prompt:
Consider the three ethical systems we studied in the course, and the three political theories.  Find a natural “pair” – that is, an ethical system that leads to a corresponding political one.  In other words, choose from among group A (Ethics) and group B (Political Science) to see the best example of one of group A matching one in group B.
I want to see how well you can evaluate the assigned material, so make sure that you engage the texts, quote the texts and think about them from the inside so that your connection is a well informed one. Your comparison should be based on significant aspects of the theories, not superficial ones.
DO NOT CONSULT OUTSIDE SOURCES OR MATERIAL IN THE TEXT WE HAVE NOT COVERED IN THESE TWO PARTICULAR MODULES (ETHICS AND POLITICS).  Choose thinkers whom we have studied in the modules, not just anyone in the text. 
Make sure to read the Rubric, the “Reaction Paper Expectation and Guidance” page from the first Module, as well as the parts of the syllabus which provide advice on how to write your paper so you get the most information you can to be as successful as you can.As a reminder – here is the advice that the syllabus stated:
Reaction Papers:  You will be asked to write short summary papers of about 3 – 5 pages in length which will test your understanding of a given topic after you have read it, been quizzed on it, and discussed it.  You are therefore expected to be an “expert” on the material by the time you begin to write, and will be pulling things together on the assumption that you understand the pieces.  They are thus intended to encourage you to keep thinking about and coming to understand a topic over a longer period of development.  These papers will be graded on both style and content.  The former will include things like how well it reads, how clear it is, and whether it is organized and structured.  The latter is basically how well you engage the text.   By “engaging the text” I mean that you should let the text talk for you – that is, develop your opinions from the thinker’s ideas.  It is more important in this course to grapple with the ideas of the thinkers than express your own opinions.  The latter is, of course, easier – but the point of this course is for you to deal with new ideas.  It is great to make connections to your own perspectives, but first and foremost you want to demonstrate that you have read and understood the text.  That is the major thing I am looking for – the footprint of the text in your paper.  So, it is important to be able to understand the material and to express that understanding clearly.  If you are not good at writing short essays, you should seek additional help.  The point of my lectures is to explicate the text, and to help you to understand what you read, but do not quote them or refer to them – refer to the text in your paper.  Hence, for the best grade, the papers must include references to the text (a quote a two) and must not refer to what I have said in class.  
Section Goals – Political Science
In this module we will be looking at the principles that found political systems. There are many forms of government out there, and they are all based on some fundamental ideas about “good,” human nature, and who “the people” are. We will look at 3 theories here, but again, there are more. We are looking at: (1) Monarchy with Thomas Hobbes, (2) Liberal Democracy with James Madison and John Stuart Mill, and (3) Communism with Karl Marx.
Here is a video which explains Plato’s idea of the “Degeneration of Regimes” from BK VIII of the Republic. It is a great model to understand the relation between human nature (the soul) and political systems (regimes) and hence a good way to generally introduce a discussion on different perspectives of political science:
Play media comment.
Assigned Sources:
1. Hobbes’ Leviathan (and video)
2. Mill’s On LIberty, and Madison’s Federalist 10 (and video)
3. Marx’s Communist Manifesto (and video)
Things to notice:
These three theories are quite different because they have a different view of what people are really like, and consequently what a government must do. If one does not trust people, they are likely to have a Hobbesian view of things and will have recourse to a strong police force to keep people in line – perhaps even constant surveillance. If one accepts that people will always be in different groups which are at odds with each other, then Madison’s idea of setting the groups against each other so that no one can take over makes sense. Finally, if one believes that the rich will get richer, and that corporate profits will come at the expense of society, the worker, the environment etc, then one might agree with Marx and hold that industry should be controlled by the people rather than the rich. All in all, notice how one’s fundamental attitude toward what comprises the “good life” and what people are naturally like will inform one’s political perspective.

What is Political Science?
Political science is the body of knowledge which deals with the proper ordering of cities. In other words, it asks the questions of how to organize people into communities. Needless to say, there are many ideas as to the best way to govern people, so Political Science is the process of arguing which is the best of possible ways. Here we will look at a few of the many perspectives on the best form of political organization.
For the most part, a political philosophy can be traced back to a perspective of human nature. That is, one must have an understanding of what people are and what they are like in order to lead or organize them. We will look at 3 different perspectives here. We will look at Hobbes, who advocated that people are essentially selfish and violent and for that reason needed a strong king to keep them in order. Next, we will look at Neitszche who believed that there were essentially two types of nature – the noble and the slave, and that the noble possessed the strength and creative power of a society. As a result, he advocated for an aristocratic form of government which allowed the noble class to lead the rest. Mill, and the Founders tended to believe that people should be considered as essentially autonomous bearers of rights and, consequently, that societies should be organized as to allow the greatest liberty as possible.
Here is a video on Justice – which is the foundation of any political system. It is a great introduction to the debate about which form of justice should be the central priority of a political system:
What Is Justice?: Crash Course Philosophy #40 (Links to an external site.)

The Case for Monarchy (Hobbes)

The Problem: People are selfish, greedy and violent and will only get along when someone more powerful makes them
The Solution: Absolute Monarchy – a system of one person rule, where that person has absolute power
Brief Overview: Thomas Hobbes lived in a time in which order was challenged in a profusion religious and political revolutions. His view of human nature consequently tended to be rather pessimistic. He believed that people are motivated for the most part by self interest and so the only successful government would be one that used the selfishness of people to bind them together. In the passages from the Leviathan that we will be looking at, Hobbes first discusses his notion of human nature, and later applied that nature to the idea of a commonwealth. It is important to understand what he thought about the role of reason in human behavior and what truly motivated people to act. This understanding is what led to his opinion that a strong monarchy was needed.
Key Passages in Hobbes’ Leviathan:
Part One
p. 562 – Introduction – man as machine and nature of “commonwealth”
p. 568 – Ch.V Sec.1-2 – nature of human reason
p. 572 – Ch. VI Sec. 2-3, 7 – the appetites and their role in assigning “good”
p. 577 – Ch. XIII – how equality leads to violence
p. 579 – Ch. XIV Sec.1-9 – natural rights and laws
Part Two
p. 590 – Ch.XVII Sec. 1 – point of a commonwealth and how men are restrained
p. 591 – Sec. 13 – the power that founds and constitutes a commonwealth

The Case for a Liberal Republic (Mill and Madison)

The Problem: Republics are the best form of government (to the Founders) but they are unstable and lead to faction and civil war
The Solution: Assume that people will always be in warring factions, but pit them against each other so no one particular one can take over and take away the freedom of the others.
Brief Overview: The idea of “republic” is based on the belief that people are more or less equal and can come together to rule themselves. “Liberty,” which informs the Liberal Republic, was generally meant to convey the idea that when people are as free as possible from the intellectual, religious and political constraints over them, they are more likely to choose types of government that are best for their flourishing. John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty very succinctly lays out the main ideas behind Liberal rights, and it is quite short. Also, some of the writing of James Madison, especially Federalist 10, provide an American perspective on Liberty and the good ordering of a state.
This PDF is your reading for this module: James Madison’s Federalist 10 (click on link) (Links to an external site.)
Here is a version in which I have numbered the paragraphs and pages for easier reference: Fed10Annotated 
download
The John Stuart Mill selection is in the text. It is “On Liberty” (p.1220-1222)
Both of these passages are relatively short and straight forward. Read them carefully and for questions, visit the Informal Discussion Forum.
Scroll to the bottom of this page – under the Fed 10 screen version there are a few videos
In case the above link is not working…here is Federalist 10:
|| Federalist No. 10 ||
The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
From the New York Packet.
Friday, November 23, 1787.
Author: James Madison
To the People of the State of New York:
AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.
It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.
The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.
By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations:
In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.
It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.
The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,–is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must sec